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A Network of Thrones: Kinship and Conflict
in Europe, 1495–1918†
By Seth G. Benzell and Kevin Cooke*
We construct a database linking European royal kinship networks,
monarchies, and wars to study the effect of family ties on conflict. To
establish causality, we exploit decreases in connection caused by apolitical deaths of rulers’ mutual relatives. These deaths are associated
with substantial increases in the frequency and duration of war. We
provide evidence that these deaths affect conflict only through changing the kinship network. Over our period of interest, the percentage of
European monarchs with kinship ties increased threefold. Together,
these findings help explain the well-documented decrease in European
war frequency. (JEL D74, N33, N34, N43, N44, Z12, Z13)
Bella gerant alii; tu, felix Austria, nube. Nam que Mars aliis, dat tibi regna
Venus. 1
—Unofficial Habsburg Motto

M

Although marriages may secure peace, they certainly cannot make
it p erpetual; for as soon as one of the pair dies, the bond of accord is
broken …
—Desiderius Erasmus, Education of a Christian Prince (1532)

any theories of international conflict relying on system and state-level characteristics have been quantitatively investigated (e.g., balance of power, ideology, and national or class interests). These levels of analysis abstract from the role of
individual “great men.” This may be a grave omission in settings like early modern
Europe. This period was characterized by increasingly centralized monarchies, a
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1
“Let others wage war; you, happy Austria, marry. For what Mars awards to others, Venus gives to thee.”
Traditionally attributed to fourteenth- or fifteenth-century statesmen, the motto was only popularized much later.
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system of government that placed the personal relationships of monarchs at the center of politics. Dynastic marriages, strategically arranged by the Habsburgs and others, knit together ruling families across the continent. Using genealogical data, we
provide evidence that the interpersonal kinship relationships among rulers played a
critical role in interstate conflict, bringing individual-level theories into the realm
of quantitative analysis. We show, ceteris paribus, that countries led by rulers with
family ties were less likely to fight wars. This study adds to a growing literature
supporting the view that individual leaders play an important role in political and
macroeconomic outcomes.2
To study the relationship between kinship networks and war, we construct a
unique dataset that combines genealogical records of European royalty with contemporaneous conflict data. Our dataset links three main components. First, we generate a list of sovereign Christian monarchies. For each monarchy, we document its
history of rulers. Second, we combine and expand existing datasets on European
states, conflicts, and related covariates. Finally, we build a dynamic kinship network
between the royals of Europe based on Tompsett’s (2014) genealogical data. Nodes
in the network are individuals alive in a given year; edges exist between siblings,
parents and children, and married couples. Pairs of monarchs may be connected
more or less closely through these ties. The network evolves as individuals are born,
marry, divorce, and die.
Due to the endogenous nature of marriage, estimating a causal relationship is not
straightforward. The explicit purpose of many royal marriages was to end a conflict
or reduce the likelihood of future conflict. Therefore, kinship ties may have been
disproportionately formed between dynasties with a high propensity for war. This
would introduce a positive bias in any OLS estimate of the effect of kinship on war.
We provide a conceptual framework that captures this idea and helps to guide our
analysis.
We overcome this challenge by exploiting exogenous negative variation in kinship ties caused by the deaths of individuals important to the kinship network. When
a mutual relative along the shortest path between a pair of monarchs dies, that path
is broken. The kinship distance between the pair of rulers (weakly) increases. The
deceased individuals may be rulers themselves or other members of a royal family
(although we never use a monarch’s death as an instrument for their own country’s political ties). To ensure deaths are exogenous with regard to the international
political situation, we exclude deaths due to battle, assassination, and execution.
Using variation in kinship network distance induced by these deaths, we show that
increased kinship distance is associated with a higher rate of conflict between a pair
of countries.
We find quantitatively large effects. Our results imply that a pair of monarchs
whose only family connection is a pair of married children would see a 9.5 percentage point increase in their annual war probability if this marriage tie were dissolved.
This finding is robust to different measures of kinship distance. This result is strong

2

See, e.g., Jones and Olken (2005) on leaders and economic growth and Fisman (2001) on political connections.
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evidence for the claim that kinship ties between rulers increase the likelihood of
diplomatic resolutions to potential conflicts.
Using placebo analyses and other robustness checks, we exclude certain other
mechanisms through which shortest path deaths could cause war. The death of a
monarch’s immediate relative off-path does not lead to an increased chance of war.
Shortest path deaths only raise the chance of war between the pair of impacted countries; these deaths do not affect the pair’s overall war propensity with third parties.
We also show that deaths of mutual relatives from third-party states still increase
the chance of war between dyads. Most importantly, the effect of on-path deaths
on dyadic war is still large and significant even after excluding on-path deaths of
monarchs from third countries. This indicates that the effect we detect is not solely
driven by succession crises, economic shocks, or political vacuums introduced by
monarchical death.
In reduced form, we show that dyadic war probability increases after the death of
an on-path mutual relative.3 The most conservative way to interpret such a finding
is that o n-path deaths raise the chance of war but tell us nothing about the effect
of kinship connection itself. However, we believe that the historical and statistical
evidence allows us to make a stronger claim. Our interpretation is that kinship ties
between rulers lower negotiation costs and increase the peace dividend, increasing
the likelihood of diplomatic resolutions to potential conflicts. This interpretation
does not rule out the likely possibility that the effect of kinship ties on conflict is
mediated by one or more interrelated channels. For example, tight kinship ties might
increase trade or cultural diffusion between a pair of countries, increasing the peace
dividend. Similarly, monarchs connected by kinship might trust each other more or
be better able to observe each other’s actions, either of which might lower negotiation costs. We leave disentangling these intermediate mechanisms connecting kinship and war to future research, should the necessary data ever become available.4
In line with previous literature, we observe a more than 50 percent decline in
the prevalence of war after 1800 (Levy 1983, Gat 2013). We also document a new
fact: kinship ties between European monarchs grew substantially over time. If one
accepts our preferred interpretation, that kinship networks promote peace, growing kinship networks can explain 45 percent of the nineteenth-century decline in
European war frequency.
I. Background

We limit our analysis to the monarchies of Christian Europe from 1495 to 1918.5
Giving a complete account of this rich and fascinating period is far beyond the
3
These deaths can be viewed as an “intent-to-treat” true underlying kinship, with our IV analysis being a way
to put units on the concept of “kinship.”
4
A shock to kinship ties likely simultaneously changes many aspects of the relationship between countries.
We measure the net effect of such a change to the international system on conflict. Unfortunately, no satisfactory
long-term c ross-country panels of bilateral trade, cultural diffusion, royal cohabitation, or courtly information gathering currently exist to study any of these mechanisms in sufficient detail to study the interrelation between these
outcomes.
5
Geographically, this roughly corresponds to continental Europe, the British Isles, the Mediterranean Islands,
and Russia. While, for example, the Ottoman Empire played a major role in European conflict, we are not aware
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scope of this paper. However, this section briefly describes some of the institutions
relevant to our analysis.6
During the period from the end of the fifteenth century to the middle of the
eighteenth century—typically referred to as “early modern”—monarchy was an
ubiquitous form of government. While many monarchs aspired to absolute power,
most early modern European dynastic governments were mixed systems with varying degrees of royal, aristocratic, and parliamentary power.7 In the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, the trend was toward centralization of power in the hands of
the monarch. Toward the end of our sample, constitutional constraints limited the
power of monarchs in many countries.8 Whatever their de jure and de facto limitations, the monarch was always one of the most, if not the most, important leaders
in any polity during our period. This was especially true when it came to matters of
interstate conflict. For example, in Britain, even during periods when the Parliament
and Cabinet decided whether to declare war, the king was in charge of the war’s
conduct (Hoffman 2012).
In most monarchies, rule was hereditary, although countries differed in the details
of succession (especially regarding the possibility of women to inherit the throne).9
A common norm was that in order to be eligible to inherit a throne, both parents of
an heir must be royal. In some regions with stronger aristocracies (such as Poland),
the monarch would be elected for life by a council of nobles. Importantly, even in
these regions, new leaders were typically selected from a single great family.
Monarchs were not only political leaders but also patriarchs and matriarchs of
their families. Close family members of the ruler were often selected to be ambassadors, advisers, and military leaders. Marriages of members of the royal family were
typically arranged or approved by the monarch.10
These institutions made dynastic marriage a common way to build relatively stable political connections between polities. Fleming (1973) provides evidence that
such marriage arrangements were greatly influenced by international and domestic
political concerns. Studying the descendants of King George I of England, she finds
that royals were more likely to marry foreigners, other royals, and close relatives
when compared to the lower nobility. Royals were also less likely to marry commoners. In the data section of this paper, we comprehensively document the ubiquity of interdynastic ties.
of any examples of Christian and non-Christian royal intermarriage during this interval. Therefore, the exclusion
of non-Christian states does not impact our results. For a more detailed explanation of inclusion criteria, see online
Appendix A.
6
For a one-volume history focused on international conflict, consider Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy, from
1453 to the Present (Simms 2014).
7
Absolute monarchy was an ideal articulated by Jean Bodin and others. For more details on early modern government, see Bonney (1991), especially chapter 6, “The Rise of European Absolutism.”
8
Marshall and Gurr (2014) provide an index of the constraints on the authority of monarchs covering the last
century of our sample. In 1816, they score 16 monarchies in our data. They find in 11 that the monarch had “unlimited authority.” By 1900, only two monarchies maintain this status. On a scale of 1 –7, the average constraint score
increased from 1.875 in 1816 to 5.36 in 1900.
9
Roca Fernández (2016) investigates the consequences of inheritance rules for the development of state capacity, arguing male primogeniture leads to more powerful states in the long run.
10
Sometimes this principle was legally codified. For example, King George III, upset at the nonstrategic marriage of his brother, passed the Royal Marriages Act (1772) through Parliament, which required members of the
English royal family to have their marriages approved by the reigning monarch. This law was only repealed in 2015.
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The Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor and Austrian Archduke Maximilian I
(r.1486–1519) was especially adept at marriage arrangements. Marrying Mary of
Burgundy in 1477, he gained control of her principalities in the Low Countries. To
secure an ally in the interminable Valois-Habsburg struggle with France in Italy, he
married his son Philip “the Handsome” to Joanna “the Mad” of Castile in 1498. To
reduce border tensions with East European neighbors, granddaughters and grandsons were married to Hungarian and Bohemian rulers. This series of marriages
set the groundwork for one of the most successful dynasties in history. Habsburgs
would go on to rule lands from the Philippines to Budapest.11
Fichtner (1976) uses the marriage negotiation letters of sixteenth-century
Habsburgs to craft a broader anthropological theory of European royal marriage.
She finds that royal marriages entailed marathon negotiations over dowries, inheritance rights, and international political obligations. The size of dowries involved
(usually bidirectional) could rival the yearly maintenance of standing armies. These
marriages allowed the Habsburgs to install spies and influencers in foreign courts
and place Habsburgs in lines of succession.12 These connections also created lines of
communication that could remain active even when serious disruptions took place.
The Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) provides an illuminating example of the relationship of kinship networks to conflict. In the preceding century, Lutheranism and
Calvinism had spread across the Holy Roman Empire. A series of wars of religion
rocked the continent. With religion so politically charged, interconfessional royal
marriages became very rare. An important tool for the de-escalation of dynastic
conflict was eliminated.
Protestant Bohemian nobles, concerned about the erosion of Protestant rights,
brought the lingering conflict to a head. They did so by throwing the Habsburgs’
representatives out a window in 1618 (in the Second Defenestration of Prague) and
calling for the election of a Protestant prince. The ruler they chose in 1619 was
Frederick V, elector of The Palatinate (r.1610–1623). This outcome was unacceptable to the Habsburgs (Bohemia being a pivotal voter in the electoral college that
selected the Holy Roman Emperor), and a steadily escalating conflict ensued.
Figure 1 shows the family and ancestral relationships between the states of
Europe in 1618, just prior to the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War. From this figure
alone, one can predict the two primary blocs that would take shape during the war.
On the left, note three main clusters of connections: the Catholics of France, Spain,
and Southern Italy; a second cluster of Catholic states in Austria, Bohemia, and
Poland; and a Protestant cluster, containing England, the Netherlands, Denmark,
and the Protestant electorates of the empire (Prussia, Saxony, and the Palatinate).
The division between these camps is clearly centered in modern Germany and the

11
The seminal paper in network analysis of political connections comes from just before our period of interest.
Padgett and Ansell (1993) use network centrality to explain how the Medici, a noble family of no particular note in
1400, rose to the pinnacle of Florentine politics in 1434. Their thesis is that Cosimo de’ Medici forged a series of
marriages and business ties that placed his family “between” the other great families of Florence. This allowed the
Medici the opportunity to be involved in nearly all decisions of consequence.
12
“In an age when accurate information from abroad was at a premium, a child at a foreign court could keep one
apprised of events there. Ferdinand’s daughter Catherine reported to her father regularly about dealings between her
husband, King Sigismund Augustus of Poland, and Muscovy… .” (Fichtner 1976, 245).
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Notes: The figures above report kinship and genetic ties between rulers in 1618, the beginning of the Thirty Years’
War. Black dots represent capitals. In the left figure, lines connect any pair of capitals ruled by monarchs with a living kinship connection. We say a pair of monarchs are connected by a living kinship tie if there is a path of edges
connecting them. An edge exists between any living parent/child, sibling, and married pair of individuals. In the
right figure, lines connect capitals ruled by a pair of monarchs who share a great-grandparent. Connections display
clear Catholic/Protestant and Habsburg/Non-Habsburg divisions.

Netherlands, which was to be the battlefield for the conflict. The second map displays the ancestral Habsburg ties linking the family’s Austrian and Spanish branches.
Arguably, it was Frederick V’s centrality in the international system that led “The
Bohemian Revolt” to escalate into a century-defining war. The lands controlled
directly by Frederick V were relatively weak, but he was at the center of Protestant
politics. Frederick V was the son of the founder of the Protestant Union, which contained many other Protestant-leaning principalities of the Holy Roman Empire. He
was closely connected by ancestry and marriage to the most important Protestant
states in Europe. King James I of England (r.1567–1625) was his father-in-law,
William the Silent of Orange (r.1544–1584) (first Stadtholder of the independent
Netherlands) was his grandfather, the elector George William of Brandenburg
(r.1619–1640) was his brother-in-law, and Christian IV of Denmark (r.1588–1648)
was his uncle-in-law. All of these states would eventually be drawn into the war.
The Habsburgs too drew in familial allies. Phillip III (r.1598–1621) of the Spanish
Habsburgs begrudgingly rallied to his cousins’ cause.
Figure 2 displays the time trends in war and connectedness. It suggests an inverse
relationship, driven by a decrease in conflict and increase in connections in the nineteenth century. The years between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I, sometimes
known as “The Concert of Europe,” were atypically peaceful. A “Holy Alliance” of
the major monarchs of Europe was declared, dedicated to defending royal prerogatives and conservative values against the new ideas sweeping Europe. This alliance,
explicitly a fraternity, may have only been possible because of their increasing sense
of kinship.13
13
The text of the Holy Alliance (1815) declares that “… the three contracting Monarchs will remain united
by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and, considering each other as f ellow-countrymen, they will, on
all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance; and, regarding themselves toward their subjects

108

AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: APPLIED ECONOMICS

JULY 2021

Trends in kinship and conflict
War of Spanish
Succession
(1701–1714)

Luther’s theses
(1517)
Thirty Years’ War
(1618–1648)

1

0.15

0.75

0.1

0.5

0.05

0.25

Share connected

War frequency

0.2

French Revolution and
Napoleonic Wars
(1792–1815)
War of Austrian
Succession
Concert
(1740–1748)
of Europe
(1816–WWI)

0

0
1500

1550

1600

1650

1700

1750

1800

1850

1900

Year
Figure 2
Notes: Hollow circles report the share of m
 onarchy-pairs (dyads) ruled by monarchs with kinship ties by decade. A
pair of monarchs are connected by a kinship tie if there is a path of edges connecting them. An edge exists between
any parent/child, sibling, or married pair of living individuals. Solid circles report share of years these country pairs
were at war, left axis. Second-order polynomials are fitted to each data series. Important political events indicated.
War frequency and kinship connection, averaged by decade, are negatively correlated, ρ = − 0.197.

On the eve of World War I, after a century of peace, levels of royal connection were extremely high. King George V of the United Kingdom (r.1910–1936),
Czar Nicholas II of Russia (r.1894–1917), and Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany
(r.1888–1918) were all first cousins, grandchildren of Queen Victoria of England
(r.1819–1901).14 At the same time, powerful geopolitical, technological, and social
trends pressured the continent toward war. World War I is a classic example of an
event in international relations that was overdetermined.15
In the context of these strong forces, the question is not why the system of
personal relationships between the rulers failed, but how they were able to preserve peace for so long. Kaiser Wilhelm II and Czar Nicholas remained important
and armies as fathers of families, they will lead them, in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are animated, to protect Religion, Peace, and Justice” (retrieved from https://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/diplomatic/c_alliance.html#:~:text=All%20the%20powers%20who%20shall,which%20belongs%20to%20
them%2C%20will).
14
George V and Wilhelm II were her biological grandchildren. Nicholas II was a g randson-in-law, having married Victoria’s granddaughter Alix of Hesse in 1894.
15
Identifying the source of World War I is something of a cottage industry, with scores of hypothesized causes
including imperialism, French revanchism, pan-Slavism, social Darwinism, a polarized and secretive alliance
network, arms races on land and sea, and military technologies that favored strategic surprise (the “Cult of the
Offensive”).
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d ecision-makers, but democracy in the United Kingdom had developed to the point
that King George V had limited influence. On the eve of the war, the German and
Russian rulers exchanged a series of personal telegrams signed “Willy” and “Nicky,”
desperately trying to de-escalate the conflict. However, since their grandmother’s
death, the two had grown into mutual distrust and suspicion.16 This last gesture
toward brotherhood proved too little too late, and with the war came the end of a
Europe dominated by kings and czars.17
II. Connecting Kinship and Conflict

Our paper is motivated by a clear historical record demonstrating that European
monarchs and their advisers treated dynastic marriage negotiations, papal annulments, lines of succession, and the bonds of kinship between rulers as central to
foreign policy. Uniting these considerations are their origins in family networks.
Changes in these familial network connections are therefore likely to be associated
with political outcomes and, ultimately, war.
Kinship ties between monarchs might directly help them to resolve disputes
amicably, either through creating trust or promoting information exchange.18
Alternatively, kinship ties between rulers could have an indirect effect. For example, individuals who are closely connected to a pair of rulers might be well placed
to create and manage trade ties between their nations. Surplus from this trade might
tend to promote peace, an effect that would dissipate with the well-connected magnate’s death.19 We wish to emphasize that our paper makes no serious effort to
distinguish between these mechanisms. A causal connection between royal kinship
ties and peace is interesting whether kinship’s effect is direct or operates indirectly
through creating economic or cultural ties.
In order to understand whether there is any causal relationship between royal
kinship and war, direct or otherwise, we sketch a conceptual framework. This framework highlights the endogenous nature of dynastic ties and motivates the need for a
source of exogenous variation. We study country-pairs (dyads) as our basic unit of
16
While signing the mobilization order, Kaiser Wilhelm II remarked, “To think George and Nicky should have
played me false! If my grandmother had been alive, she would never have allowed it.”
17
Although at least one Polish royal did not believe this at the time. Princess Radziwill’s fascinating handbook
to the royal marriage market discusses the politics and culture of royal marriages leading up to the war and predicts
the consequences of the war for future marriages. In 1915, she writes, “It is probable however, that, after the present
war has come to an end, Royal alliances will become once more subjects of general interest, and of greater importance than has been the case during the last twenty years or so. This fact has led me to include in my book a review
of the personages eligible to become one day the consorts of European rulers” (Radziwill 1915, vi).
18
This could be because the rulers are more disposed to trust connected rulers (as in L
 évi-Strauss’s 1949 theories of marriage alliance among primitive tribes). Alternatively, close family ties might aid dispute resolution by
facilitating the spread of information. This information spread may be overt (as connected rulers spend more time
interacting with each other, for example, during family events and holidays) or covert (as a daughter married abroad
might serve as a spy at a foreign court, as in Fichtner 1976). Close family ties could also prevent conflict by raising
the expected cost of war or the surplus from peace. For instance, a shared interest in a mutual relative might prompt
cooperation between rulers. The possibility that a mutual relative would serve as a hostage, and therefore provide
insurance against aggression, is a more cynical version of that idea. The fact that a pair of closely connected rulers
(or their heirs) have a chance of inheriting each other’s domains may also give them a further interest in promoting
bilateral prosperity.
19
Jackson and Nei (2015) advance a theoretical argument that alliance networks without a peace surplus from
trade are inherently unstable. They argue that the post-eighteenth-century rise in international trade decline contributed to a decrease in war frequency.
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analysis. In each period, we assume that a given dyad experiences a potential conflict
with a fixed probability, p. This represents the idiosyncratic latent war p ropensity
of the dyad. Dyads have different latent war propensities for a variety of reasons,
including religious tensions or compatibility, their degree of cultural similarity, trading proclivity, border friction, or historical acrimony.
However, political friction does not necessarily have to lead to war. Diplomatic
intervention can prevent these potential conflicts from escalating. Conditional on a
potential conflict arising, we assume that a dyad is able to successfully reach a diplomatic solution with probability q . The chance of war in a given year is therefore
p(1 − q).
To capture the role of family ties, we posit that q is a function of the level of
kinship connection between the leaders of the country-pair. We hypothesize that the
probability a dyad reaches a peaceful settlement is an increasing function of inverse
kinship distance.20 We denote this by q ( 1/d).
This framework suggests that an exogenous increase in kinship network distance, d, lowers q and thus leads to more frequent wars. However, endogenous
marriage decisions can obscure this effect. To see why, suppose war is socially inefficient and that a dyad can reduce war frequency by exerting costly effort to lower d.
In this setting, dyads with a large p have a correspondingly large (Coasian) incentive
to form tighter kinship bonds (e.g., through strategic marriage). Therefore, we are
likely to observe pairs with the highest latent war propensity forming the tightest
kinship ties. This means a simple regression of war frequency on 1 /dwill produce
a coefficient with positive bias.
Therefore, our study requires a source of exogenous variation in network structure to recover the causal effect of kinship networks on war frequency. The ideal
experiment would take two ex ante identical country pairs and randomly vary one of
the pair’s level of connection. Any subsequent difference in conflict behavior would
be attributed to the changed kinship network. Our empirical strategy will approximate this by using variation in a dyad’s kinship distance following the apolitical
deaths of individuals important to the network.21
Before turning to a description of our data, we draw attention to a key feature
of this conceptual framework. In it, wars are m
 ulticausal events. Many different
geopolitical, economic, technological, or social circumstances can lead countries
to the precipice of conflict. Still more factors determine whether these potential
conflicts erupt into violence. We interpret family ties as being among the second
set of factors that determine whether potential conflicts become actual wars. This
has an important implication for timing in our empirical analysis. Specifically,
this framework implies that shocks to kinship ties should be expected to have an
immediate effect on conflict frequency at the margin. Analogously, removing a
safety net does not slowly build pressure toward a circus performer being injured.

20
Inverse kinship distance, 1/d, is a convenient measure of connectivity that varies between zero and one and
deals with disconnected dyads in a natural way by defining 1/∞to be zero.
21
Earlier versions of this paper used the gender of firstborn children as an instrument for the probability of
royal marriage. This approach yields point estimates that are consistent with our main results but not statistically
significant.
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Rather, the removal of a safety net immediately increases the odds of injury, conditional on a fall occurring.22
III. Data Description

Our analysis is based on a newly constructed dataset on royal kinship networks
and wars.23 The final dataset takes the form of an unbalanced panel of country
dyads. Our analysis is restricted to sovereign Christian European monarchies from
1495 to 1918. This limitation focuses on the types of states for which dynastic connections are important and aids in collecting a comprehensive dataset. For a complete description of the data and its construction, as well as variables collected but
not used in this analysis, see online Appendix A.
A. Summary Statistics
Our raw data consist of 92,321 country-pair (dyad) years. Monarchs are matched
to these countries primarily using Spuler (1977). Of these dyads, 3,895 d yad-years
are in personal union, where the same ruler controlled two crowns (i.e., countries)
simultaneously. By construction, personal unions are never at war, so these pairs are
not included in the analysis.
There are 865 country pairs in our sample. In Table 1, we report summary statistics for our data. The first group of variables measure conflict activity. These variables are primarily based on Wright (1942), but we expand and reconcile this data
with other sources. War is a dummy variable that indicates whether a pair of countries are at war in a given year. War Start (Continue) is a dummy for whether a pair
begins (continues) a war, conditional on being at peace (war) in the previous year.
Wars start in approximately 0.9 percent of previously peaceful dyads. Conditional
on being at war in a given year, 81.4 percent of dyads continue into the next year.
Together, this implies an overall war frequency of 4 percent of d yad-years. Dyads
are very heterogeneous in their bellicosity. Some never fight wars, while others are
longtime rivals. For example, France and the Archduchy of Austria (and its successor states), which c oexist for 363 years in our data, are at war in 25 percent of
years.24 Generally, our analysis focuses on bilateral measures of conflict. However,
for a robustness check, we also make use of a measure of whether either member
of a dyad is engaged in any inter-monarchical European war at all in a given year
(either with each other or with a third party)—“Any War.”
22
Note also that an expert performer might be less likely to request a net, thereby obscuring the relationship
between nets and safety.
23
Three recent papers use data similar to ours. Iyigun (2008) uses Brecke’s “Conflict Catalogue” and finds
strong evidence that Ottoman invasions aided the spread of Protestantism in Europe in the sixteenth century. Iyigun,
Nunn, and Qian (2017) use Brecke and other conflict data to study the effect of climate change on European war.
Dube and Harish (2020) study the effect of ruler gender on conflict. Like us, they construct a dataset matching
Wright’s (1942) war data to Tompsett’s genealogical data. Dube and Harish use the genealogical data to identify
the gender of rulers’ close relatives. They use this information to make a compelling case that female rulers were
more bellicose than men. In the online data construction Appendix, we discuss the advantages of our dataset versus
these similar ones.
24
See Table 11 in online Appendix D for additional dyads of interest.
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Table 1—Summary Statistics
Observations

Mean

SD

Min

Max

War
War Start
War Continue
Any War
ln(1 + Battle Deaths)
ln(1 + ( Battle Deaths/Dyad-Years))

88,426
84,992
3,434
88,426
88,148
88,148

0.040
0.009
0.815
0.483
0.462
0.294

0.196
0.093
0.389
0.500
2.455
1.575

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
16.792
15.302

Shortest Path Length
Resistance Distance
Genetic Distance
Number of Immediate Relatives

34,810
34,810
54,122
88,426

7.265
2.799
4.616
10.266

4.690
2.022
1.680
5.231

1
0.19538
1
0

30
15.752
7
34

Same Religion
ln(Distance)
Neither Landlocked
Adjacent

88,426
88,426
88,426
88,426

0.449
6.921
0.603
0.137

0.497
0.678
0.489
0.344

0
3.2793
0
0

1
9.335
1
1

Notes: This table summarizes three categories of variables: conflict measures, network measures, and dyadic covariates. We provide several measures of conflict frequency and severity. Our network measures describe a pair of rulers’
current level of bilateral connection (Shortest Path and Resistance), shared ancestral ties (Genetic Distance), and overall number of connections (Immediate Relatives). The remaining variables include religious and geographic controls.

In addition, we present two measures of conflict severity based on Brecke (2012).
For most of the wars in our data (i.e., sets of dyad-years of conflict), Brecke reports
the number of deaths in battle from the war; however, Brecke does not assign these
deaths to particular countries or years within the larger conflict. Although this is
imperfect, Brecke’s data are the best available for measuring the relative severity
of conflicts during this period. Our first measure of conflict severity is simply
ln(1 + Battle Deaths). However, this does not take into account conflict duration
or the number of participants. It is essentially an upper bound on the number of
deaths that are associated with a particular dyad-year of conflict. We also present a
second measure, ln(1 + (Battle Deaths/Dyad-Years)), which adjusts for the length
and breadth of the conflict. Effectively, this measure assumes that battle deaths were
evenly distributed among d yad-years within each of Brecke’s wars. Both of these
measures are equal to zero for dyads not at war in a year.
The second class of variables are pairwise covariates. Primarily, these are geographic variables that are derived from Reed (2016). Reed provides maps of Europe
for our entire time period at very high frequency. The variables “Neither Landlocked”
and “Adjacent” are self-explanatory dummy variables, which vary over time with
border changes. We also record the natural log of the distance between two countries’
capitals in kilometers. Additionally, we construct a dummy for whether the pair of
rulers are members of the same religious group (Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox).
The final class of variables are based on Tompsett’s (2014) genealogical data. The
genealogy has 872 individuals alive in the median year, but this amount increases strongly
in later years. Figure 10 in the online Appendix plots the number of living nobles in our
data by year. The average pair of rulers have 10.3 immediate family connections (i.e.,
parents, spouses, siblings, or children) between them. Rulers sometimes share immediate family members, so this corresponds to somewhat more than 5.1 immediate family
members per ruler. We reconstruct these data as a dynamic kinship network.
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B. Kinship Network Definitions
We define our kinship network in the following way. Nodes in the network are
individuals alive in a given year. Edges exist between immediate family members.
Immediate family relations are parent/child, sibling, and spousal. Each year, the
set of nodes is updated based on births and deaths. Links are added for births and
marriages and removed after deaths and divorces. Using this network, we calculate
measures of kinship distance.
Shortest Path is our primary measure of kinship distance between rulers. The
shortest path between two rulers is simply the minimum number of network links
that must be traversed to get from one ruler to the other. We also measure the
Resistance Distance between rulers. While shortest path distance only looks at one
path between rulers, resistance distance is an all-path measure inspired by electrical
resistance. This measure is decreasing in the number of paths between two rulers
and increasing in the length of each of these paths. If no path exists, both of these
measures are defined to be infinity. Only finite values are summarized in the table
above. A total of 39.3 percent of dyad-years are connected by living kinship ties.
This is mostly driven by within-dyad variation. Of 274 dyads with more than 100
years of coexistence, only 12 are never connected.
The share of states connected by living ties trends upward over time after a slight
dip in the decades after Luther’s Theses. In the 1580s, only 11 percent of states
are connected, the lowest share on record. In the 1910s, the last decade in our data
(albeit a partial one), over 95 percent are. A positive trend is still observed when
looking only at close connections of fewer than eight steps. A larger share of monarchs share a common ancestor. There is no long-term trend in the share of dyads
with a close genetic connection.
Genetic Distance is a different type of bilateral relationship measure. Instead of
relying on the dynamic network of living kinship relations, this measure is calculated from a static directed network in which links run only from children to parents.
Using this network of genetic connections, we report the maximum number of steps
from two rulers to their most recent common ancestor. We search the genealogical
data up to seven generations. Like our kinship measures, this measure is defined as
infinity if no common ancestor exists.
For more information on our genealogical data and demographic trends, see online
Appendix B. Online Appendix C provides a detailed description of the network construction and corresponding measures. For tables and figures further describing the
evolution of network ties and conflict, see online Appendix D. Online Appendix D
also reports results relating war propensity to genetic distance.
IV. Main Results

A. OLS Analysis
We are interested in the relationship between network distance and war. We begin
by estimating a baseline specification, equation (1). This equation models the probability of war as a linear function of inverse kinship network distance, (1 / d). The
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measure dis either shortest path length or resistance distance. For shortest path
length, using inverse distance has the attractive property of being bounded between
zero and one. In addition, this inverse measure captures the intuition that a unit
increase in network distance will be more important for more closely connected rulers. Taking the inverse of our distance measures allows us to deal with unconnected
pairs (d = ∞)in a natural way. This inverse distance measure takes a value of zero
when the pair is unconnected. Formally,
(1)

War( i, j),y  = α + β ⋅ (_
  1 ) i, j ,y  + δ ⋅ X(i, j),y  + θ(i, j)  + θy  + ϵ(i, j),y.
d ( )

The outcome variable, War( i, j),y, is a dummy for whether countries iand jare at war
in year y. We regress this on inverse network distance ( 1 / d). Tables refer to this
variable as ( Path)  −1 or (Resistance)  −1as appropriate. We also include a vector of
dyad-year controls X( i, j),y (including log of capital distance as well as dummies for
close genetic connection, adjacency, same religion, and neither landlocked), and
fixed effects for dyad (θ(i, j)) and year (θy ).
Estimating the baseline model with OLS reveals no significant relationship
between kinship network distance and conflict. These results are reported in Table 12
in online Appendix D. This null result holds with and without covariates and using
either shortest path length or resistance as the measure of distance.25
In Table 12 of online Appendix D and throughout the paper, we report standard
errors clustered two-way by country. This method is standard in the c ountry-level
network literature, employed in papers such as Jackson and Nei (2015). This form
of clustering helps to account for correlation among observations that share a country, both contemporaneously and over time.
Two-way clustering allows for, for example, France’s fighting a war with Austria
to be correlated with it fighting a war with Hungary. This is important both because
of the presence of stable alliance blocks and because our causal results will rely on
identifying variation based on events that are correlated between dyads that share a
country. Cameron and Miller (2015) show that this clustering procedure can miss
some relevant correlations, thus potentially underreporting standard errors. To show
our results are not driven by incorrect standard errors, we conduct Monte Carlo simulations in our robustness section.
B. Shortest Path Deaths
For reasons explained above, OLS estimates of the relationship between kinship
and conflict are likely to be biased due to the endogeneity of marriage. We therefore
use apolitical deaths of individuals on the shortest path between a pair of rulers as
25
These OLS regressions also suggest some interesting and intuitive relationships. Controlling for dyad fixed
effects, countries are more likely to fight wars when they share a border. Countries that share a religion group are
significantly less likely to fight wars. This latter relationship disappears in our subsequent section, where we instrument for connectedness. This suggests that a shared religion primarily lowers war probability by making it easier
to form marriage ties. Capital distance exhibits little variation within dyad. Therefore, it is not estimated precisely
when dyad fixed effects are included.
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A

C

B

Figure 3
−1

10
Notes: In this simple network, the shortest path from A to B is two. The resistance distance is ( _12   +  _15 )    =  _
 .
7
This graph is consistent with ruler A being married to ruler B’s daughter and ruler A’s niece being married to ruler
B’s grandson. Following C’s death, both distance measures increase to five.

an instrument. To motivate our instrumental variable analysis, we first describe the
deaths we are interested in and demonstrate their relationship to connectivity and
conflict.
Our primary kinship network measure is inverse shortest path distance. Figure 3
illustrates a hypothetical kinship network between monarchs A and B. In this figure,
the shortest path from A to B is length two and passes through individual C. If C
were to die, the shortest path length would increase to five. Note that deaths along
the shortest path mechanically weakly increase the network distance between A and
B whether measured by shortest path or resistance. These “on-path” deaths act as a
source of variation with which to identify the effect of kinship.
Of 88,426 dyad-years in the final data, 34,810 are observed to be connected by
living kinship ties. These connected dyads are the only ones that can be affected by
on-path deaths. We observe 4,498 dyad-years with an o n-path death.
Figure 4 reports, for the ten years before and after an on-path death, the yearly
mean inverse path length across the affected dyads. Formally,
  1 ) i, j ,y+t    Death( i, j),y  = 1] 
	Eˆ [(_
d ( )

|

for t ∈ 
[−10, 10].

Figure 4 shows that these on-path deaths produce a substantial and sustained
decrease in inverse shortest path length. These events result from the deaths of 274
distinct individuals, who are on—on average—the shortest paths of 16.4 dyads at
the time of their deaths. Interestingly, but unsurprisingly, these 274 key individuals
played a disproportionate role in connecting the rulers of Europe. Table 2 summarizes characteristics and causes of death for each of these individuals.
We document the cause of death for 74.1 percent of the 274 shortest path deaths in
our sample. Overwhelmingly, these deaths are peaceful and n onviolent. The leading
causes of death are old age (13.5 percent), unspecified illness (10.6 percent), and childbirth (9.9 percent), followed by a variety of specific illnesses. Of the 203 individuals
with identified causes of death, only 12 died for reasons that could be plausibly tied
to the interstate political situation. Seven were assassinated, four were executed, and
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Figure 4

Notes: The on-path death of a mutual relative along the shortest path between rulers leads to a substantial decrease
in the dyad’s kinship connection as measured by inverse shortest path length. A path consists of a series of edges in
the royal kinship network. An edge exists between any parent/child, sibling, or married pair of living individuals.
Table 2—Causes of Death and Related Characteristics for 274 Individuals Dying
on a Shortest Path
Shortest path deaths
Death cause
Unknown
Old unremarkable
Childbirth
Tuberculosis
Pneumonia
Stroke
Smallpox
Cancer
Accidental
Heart attack
Fever (cause unspecified)
Genetic
Unspecified/final illness
Other infection
Other noninfectious
Nonstroke brain
Assassination
Execution
Battle death
Individual was a monarch
Unexpected death
Stress-related death

Observations

Percent

71
37
27
11
9
8
7
7
7
2
3
3
29
19
14
8
7
4
1
76
73
40

25.9
13.5
9.9
4.0
3.3
2.9
2.6
2.6
2.6
0.7
1.1
1.1
10.6
6.9
5.1
2.9
2.6
1.5
0.4
27.7
26.6
14.6

Note: Potentially political death causes in italics.

one was hit by a cannonball (the unlucky Frederick IV, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp).
This is consistent with Hoffman’s (2012) evidence that early modern rulers, even
those who lost wars, faced little to no personal risk from international conflicts.
Cummins (2017) provides complementary evidence that the proportion of violent
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deaths among European elites substantially declined (to about 5 percent) after 1500.
While our main results are very similar with and without these 12 potentially politically motivated deaths, our subsequent analysis will be based on the remaining 262
apolitical o n-path deaths.
In further robustness checks, designed to avoid reverse causality and exclude
some nonkinship related mechanisms, we distinguish shortest path deaths by other
characteristics of the deceased individual. Specifically, we find 76 of the o n-path
deaths were monarchs, 73 were likely unexpected by contemporaries, and 40 can be
linked to stress related to tense political situations, either international or domestic.
Online Appendix Table 10 gives a full list of the names, year of death, cause of
death, and other covariates for these 274 individuals. Online Appendix A.9 and the
associated data files give more detail on how this information was collected and
categorized.
C. Event Study
On-path deaths weaken kinship ties and thus potentially influence conflict frequency. To examine this relationship, we perform an event study analysis of war
in years before and after an o n-path death. To avoid double counting of dyads, we
restrict attention to the subsample in which exactly 1 on-path death occurs in a
21-year window. Thus, the solid dots in Figure 5 report

|

[

10

]

	Eˆ  War( i, j),y+t     Death( i, j),y  = 1,   ∑  Death( i, j),y+i  = 1  
i=−10

for t ∈ 
[−10, 10].

While on-path deaths may influence the chance of war between a pair of monarchs by lowering their level of connection, they conceivably have a direct effect
as well. To explore this possibility, we also report war frequencies before and after
the deaths of any immediate relative (child, parent, sibling, or spouse) of either
monarch, excluding those on-path. These “close” or off-path deaths are more frequent than on-path deaths, and thus a smaller 13-year window is reported so that
the requirement of only 1 such death in the window is not overly demanding. The
hollow dots in Figure 5 represent

[

|

6

]

  Death  Close
	Eˆ  War( i, j),y+t     Death  Close
(i, j),y  = 1,   ∑
(i, j),y+i  = 1  
i=−6

for t ∈ 
[−6, 6].

In the years following an on-path death, there is a significant increase in war
frequency. There is no increase in war propensity after the deaths of off-path individuals closely connected to one of the pair of monarchs. This elevated conflict
propensity persists for about eight years.26
26
In both this figure and Figure 6, there is a clear decline in war frequency nine years after the on-path death.
This decrease is due in part to the ending of two large conflict episodes. The Schmalkaldic Wars and the War of
Austrian Succession both ended eight years after the deaths of a very well-connected ruler (King Francis I in
1547 and Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI in 1740, respectively). In the main event study, about 32 percent of
the p ostdeath dyadic wars are related to these two large conflicts. However, these two conflicts are not essential to
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Figure 5
Notes: This figure plots the mean war frequency between dyads in the years before and after they experience the
death of a relative. Solid dots indicate war frequency before and after an on-path death. Hollow dots are conditioned
on close family deaths that are not on-path. The dashed line indicates overall average dyadic war frequency. The
sample is restricted to dyads that experience only one death within the time horizon. Ninety-five percent confidence
intervals (based on binomial statistics) are indicated by error bars.

It is important to note that war frequency is elevated in the two years preceding
o n-path deaths. This raises the question of reverse causality, the concern that wars
are causing deaths rather than vice versa. We rule out the most direct version of this
possibility since we exclude assassinations, executions, and battle deaths. However,
it remains possible that a bellicose international environment may increase the rate
of royal deaths.
If it were indeed the case that royal deaths are more likely during periods of
elevated conflict, an increased war frequency should be present in the years before
close deaths as well. However, the close death event study (hollow dots in Figure 5)
indicates that close deaths are not associated with an elevated chance of war (pre- or
postdeath). Therefore, it would need to be that war conditions increase “on-path”
mortality but do not affect the mortality rate of a monarch’s close relatives “off-path.”
Since o n-path and o ff-path individuals are all royals, such a differential impact is
implausible.
The anticipatory effect of on-path deaths on war can be readily accounted for
without appealing to reverse causality. Many deaths are due to chronic conditions
that allow the death to be anticipated and often incapacitate the individual (perhaps
leaving them incapable of performing their network functions) in the years prior
to the actual date of death. These anticipated deaths might account for the ex ante
treatment effect.

the main results. Figure 5 only utilizes 16 percent of the 4,386 on-path deaths due to the restriction to 1 death in a
2 1-year window, a restriction designed to focus on the episodes with cleanest variation. In our main IV analysis,
these two conflicts play a smaller role. Several of our robustness specifications drop these wars entirely.
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Notes: Mean war frequency of dyads in the years before and after they experience the unexpected death of an
on-path relative. The dashed line indicates overall average war frequency. This sample is restricted to dyads that
experience only one death within the time horizon. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals (based on binomial statistics) are indicated by error bars.

In Figure 6, we repeat the event study, focusing on unexpected deaths. Unexpected
deaths are those with causes that did not manifest until within 365 days of the death
date. Focusing on unexpected deaths, we see that war frequency remains relatively
constant prior to the unexpected death and only increases once the death has occurred.
Another possible concern is that the deaths of network important individuals
increase the risk of war between all impacted countries, not just the pair that are
disconnected. Figure 7 reports the same event study, except the outcome is whether
either country in the dyad impacted by the death is involved in any war, including
a war with a third party. There is no change in the frequency of war participation
generally for dyads involved in a shortest path death.
Together, these four event studies provide strong evidence that on-path deaths of
mutual relatives are associated with an increased likelihood of war specific to the
impacted pair of countries. However, this simple event study analysis focuses on a
subset of the data with the cleanest variation and does not control for any covariates,
time trends, or dyad-specific effects. Similarly, these event studies do not quantitatively answer the question of how strongly kinship connections impact conflict
frequency. The remainder of our paper develops an instrumental variable approach
based upon variation in kinship connection induced by o n-path deaths. Unlike the
event study, this instrumental variable approach provides a quantitative answer to
the question of how changes in kinship connection affect war frequency, controlling
for a variety of important covariates.
D. Instrument Definition and Identification
To estimate the causal effect of living kinship ties on conflict, we return to our
OLS regression specification from Section IV. However, we modify the model by
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Notes: The proportion of dyads with at least one country at war (including, but not necessarily with, each other) for
the ten years before and after an o n-path death. This sample is restricted to dyads that experience only one o n-path
death within the time horizon. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals (based on binomial statistics) are indicated
by error bars.

instrumenting for inverse kinship distance with lagged o n-path deaths. Our instrument, Z( i, j),y, is a dummy for whether an o n-path death occurred in the previous five
years. Specifically, Z(i, j),y is
(2)

Z(i, j),y  =   max   Death( i, j),y−t,
t∈[1,5]

where D
 eath( i, j),yis a dummy for whether a nonpolitical death occurred along the
shortest network path between rulers iand jin year y  (ignoring contemporaneous
deaths).27
This is a somewhat coarse instrument, given that some o n-path deaths change
connectivity more than others. This coarseness is necessary in order to satisfy the
stringent conditions for instrument validity. The reason we require an instrument in
the first place is that the level of living kinship connection is endogenously determined. Any instrument constructed using information about connectivity prior to
the o n-path death will also be endogenous and therefore invalid. We provide further
discussion of the validity of our instrumental variable approach and related identification concerns as part of our robustness analysis in Section V.

27
Results are robust to alternate specifications of the instrument. The pooled dummy produces similar results,
including up to eight lags of death. Similar results can also be obtained using separate dummies for each lag of
death. We prefer the pooled specification because it eliminates worries of overfitting.
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Table 3—Main Results First Stage
(Path) −1
(1)

On-Path Death
Genetic Tie

−0.0563
(0.00920)

(Path) −1
(2)

−0.0593
(0.00937)
0.0846
(0.0186)
0.0677
(0.0132)
−0.000389
(0.0130)
0.0316
(0.0138)
−0.0265
(0.0271)

(Resistance) −1
(3)

(Resistance) −1
(4)

X
X
87,236
37.48

X
X
87,236
40.11

X
X
87,236
35.91

X
X
87,236
38.78

Same Religion
Adjacent
Neither Landlocked
ln(Distance)
Pair fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
F-statistic

−0.162
(0.0270)

−0.169
(0.0271)
0.202
(0.0393)
0.168
(0.0494)
0.0159
(0.0547)
0.0719
(0.0314)
−0.0855
(0.0862)

Notes: This table reports first-stage estimates of the relationship between kinship connections and apolitical deaths
along the shortest network path between rulers in the previous five years. All specifications include fixed effects for
dyad and year. Columns 2 and 4 include controls for geographic characteristics and each dyad’s genetic relationship
and religious similarity. Standard errors clustered two-way by country are reported in parentheses.

E. Main IV Estimates
With our instrument in hand, we use two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate
the following model:
(3)

ˆ
  1 ) i, j ,y  + δ ⋅ X(i, j),y  + θ(i, j)  + θy  + ϵ(i, j),y,
War( i, j),y  = α + β ⋅ (_
d ( )

(4)

(_
  1 ) i, j ,y  = c + ϕ Z(i, j),y  + γ ⋅ X(i, j),y  + ω(i, j)  + ωy  + ξ(i, j),y.
d ( )

This follows our OLS specification, except it treats inverse network distance as
an endogenous variable and instruments for it using a dummy for recent on-path
deaths. First-stage estimates (of equation (4)) are reported in Table 3, and causal
estimates for the impact of inverse kinship distance on war incidence are reported
in Table 4. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 3 correspond to equation (3) above, where
kinship distance is measured by shortest path length and resistance distance, respectively. Columns 1 and 3 exclude X
 (i, j),y, the vector of controls.
We find that our instrument (recent deaths) displays a strong negative correlation
with both measures of inverse kinship distance. The strength of the instrument is
evidenced by large (>10) Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics.28 Pair fixed effects control
28
One may be worried about serial correlation in our setting. In that case, Montiel Olea and Pflueger’s (2013)
weak instrument test is the appropriate one. Applying this test to our main specification (column 2 of Tables 3 and
4), we find an effective F-statistic of 41.4 and a critical value of 37.4 for (α = 0.05, τ = 0.05). This means that,
with 95 percent confidence, the worst-case bias induced by our instrument is less than 5 percent.
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Table 4—Main Results

(Path) −1
(Resistance) −1

War
(1)

−0.297
(0.0732)

Genetic Tie

−0.285
(0.0667)
0.0333
(0.0123)
−0.00416
(0.00863)
0.0303
(0.0199)
0.000446
(0.00435)
−0.0116
(∙)

Same Religion
Adjacent
Neither Landlocked
ln(Distance)
Pair fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations

War
(2)

X
X
87,236

X
X
87,236

War
(3)

War
(4)

−0.104
(0.0291)

−0.1000
(0.0271)
0.0294
(0.0128)
−0.00664
(0.00895)
0.0320
(0.0216)
−0.00136
(0.00407)
−0.0126
(∙)

X
X
87,236

X
X
87,236

Notes: This table reports estimates of a linear probability model explaining dyadic war frequency as a function of living kinship connection between rulers. To account for potentially
endogenous kinship connections, we instrument for kinship connection using variation induced
by apolitical deaths along the shortest network path between rulers in the previous five years.
All specifications include fixed effects for dyad and year. Columns 2 and 4 include controls
for geographic characteristics and each dyad’s genetic relationship and religious similarity.
Standard errors clustered two-way by country are reported in parentheses. Omitted standard
errors are due to insufficient variation (within dyad).

for the fact that dyads with different average connectedness will have different frequencies of on-path death. With these included, our identification is based on the
short-term deviation from a country pair’s average level of connectedness generated by o n-path deaths. Our estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of other
dyad-level covariates.
Columns 1–4 of Table 4 estimate the effect of kinship ties on war incidence. So
long as dyad fixed effects are included, we estimate a large and significant negative
relationship between inverse network distance, no matter how measured, and war.
Column 2 reports our preferred specification.
Given that the estimate is a local average treatment effect (LATE), care is necessary when interpreting the coefficients. A naïve reading of our results would
suggest that a change from being immediately connected, (Path)  −1  = 1, to unconnected, ( Path)  −1  = 0, causes a 28.5 percentage point increase in war incidence.
However, variation of that magnitude is never observed because a pair of rulers with
a shortest path of length one cannot have an individual between them die.
Rather, the coefficient measures a marginal effect and should be understood with
respect to the typical identifying variation. From the first-stage regressions, we see
that a recent o n-path death produces an average change in inverse shortest path
length of − 0.06. That reduction is roughly the difference between a shortest path
length of four and five. The results indicate that this variation causes (with 95 percent confidence) a 1.69 ± 0.9percentage point increase in (yearly) war incidence.
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Table 5—Alternate Outcomes First Stage
(Path) −1
(1)

On-Path Death
Genetic Tie
Same Religion
Adjacent
Neither Landlocked
ln(Distance)
Pair fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
F-statistic

(Path) −1
(2)

(Path) −1
(3)

(Path) −1
(4)

−0.0576
(0.00922)
0.0853
(0.0184)
0.0677
(0.0132)
−0.00115
(0.0137)
0.0316
(0.0140)
−0.0309
(0.0277)

−0.0838
(0.0114)
0.0117
(0.0338)
0.0714
(0.0403)
0.00317
(0.0217)
0.0335
(0.0390)
0.0187
(0.0497)

−0.0593
(0.00943)
0.0823
(0.0181)
0.0681
(0.0131)
0.000156
(0.0129)
0.0317
(0.0138)
−0.0286
(0.0265)

−0.0593
(0.00943)
0.0823
(0.0181)
0.0681
(0.0131)
0.000156
(0.0129)
0.0317
(0.0138)
−0.0286
(0.0265)

X
X
83,801
38.95

X
X
3,372
54.14

X
X
86,958
39.47

X
X
86,958
39.47

Notes: This table reports first-stage estimates of the relationship between kinship connections and apolitical deaths
along the shortest network path between rulers in the previous five years. Columns 1 and 2 restrict the sample such
that dyads were respectively at peace or war in the previous year. Standard errors clustered two-way by country are
reported in parentheses.

That is a 4 2.3 ± 17.5percent increase over the overall dyadic war frequency of
approximately 4 .0 percent. Alternatively, consider a pair of monarchs who move
from having their children married to being disconnected. This would correspond to
a decrease in inverse shortest path length of 1/3and a 9.5 percentage point increase
in war frequency in each year until the network connection is rebuilt.
These estimates suggest the role of living kinship ties in reducing conflict is substantial. Similarly large effects are estimated when we use resistance as our measure of kinship distance. These effect sizes help justify the huge amount of energy
exerted over dynastic marriage negotiations. It also helps explain the central role of
marriage in peace negotiations to end wars.
The estimated reduction in war incidence could either be from fewer wars starting
or from the wars that do occur lasting fewer years. To differentiate between these
channels, we change our outcome variable. We consider the effect of inverse network distance on whether a dyad starts (continues) a war, conditional on previously
being at peace (war). We also consider a nonbinary measure of war intensity, log of
battle deaths, as an outcome.
Estimates of these regressions are reported in Table 6. We find that increases in
inverse network distance cause decreases in both the rate at which conflicts start
and the duration of conflicts that do start. We again interpret the estimated coefficients with respect to the typical variation in path length induced by observed
on-path deaths. From columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, we see this variation is −0.058
when a dyad was at peace in the previous year and −0.084 following a year of war.
So, a typical o n-path death increases the probability of war onset by 0.29 percentage points. This is roughly a 33 percentincrease over a base war onset frequency
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Table 6—Alternate Outcomes

(Path) −1
Genetic Tie
Same Religion
Adjacent
Neither Landlocked
ln(Distance)
Pair fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
Notes

War start
(1)

War continue
(2)

Conflict severity
(3)

Conflict severity
(4)

X
X
83,801

X
X
3,372

X
X
86,958
Battle deaths

X
X
86,958
Battle deaths
per dyad-year

−0.0506
(0.0135)
0.00520
(0.00165)
−0.00483
(0.00289)
0.0104
(0.00448)
0.0113
(0.00625)
−0.00523
(0.00306)

−0.543
(0.224)
0.0150
(0.0180)
0.0198
(0.0235)
−0.0405
(0.0223)
−0.892
(0.0396)
0.0311
(∙)

−3.905
(1.036)
0.462
(0.138)
−0.0616
(0.101)
0.426
(0.261)
−0.141
(0.136)
−0.119
(∙)

−2.318
(0.592)
0.288
(0.0806)
−0.0425
(0.0629)
0.288
(0.162)
−0.0882
(0.0818)
−0.0859
(∙)

Notes: This table reports estimates of our main specification (Table 4, column 2) with alternate outcome variables. Columns 1 and 2 restrict the sample such that dyads were respectively at peace or war in the previous year.
Column 3 measures conflict severity as ln(1 + Battle Deaths). Column 4 evenly distributes battle deaths in war
among all dyad-years involved in that war. All specifications include fixed effects for dyad and year. Standard errors
clustered two-way by country are reported in parentheses. Omitted standard errors are due to insufficient variation
(within dyad).

of 0.87 percent. Similarly, the probability of a war continuing from the previous
year increases by 4.6 percentage points following a typical on-path death. This is a
proportionally smaller effect since wars continue at a rate of 81.4 percent.
Column 3 of Table 6 reports the effect of changes in network distance on conflict
severity, ln(1 + Battle Deaths). Conflict severity is measured at the war level (rather
than by dyad-year), assigning the total amount of battle deaths in the war to all
dyad-years associated with the conflict. Column 4 adjusts the conflict severity measure by the number of dyad-years involved in a war (i.e., it evenly distributes battle
deaths from the war across dyad-years). These results suggest that a typical on-path
death would increase conflict severity (as measured by battle deaths) by 14.7 percent to 26.1 percent depending on the measure used. As with our main results, a
more severe shock would have a larger effect.
V. Identification and Robustness

In this section, we first discuss the key assumptions underlying our IV analysis
and the potential threats to identification in this setting. We then present a variety of
alternate specifications of the IV analysis to address these identification concerns.
Finally, we conduct M
 onte Carlo simulations on a comparable set of placebo deaths
to allow for robust randomization inference. Randomization inference helps address
concerns that our analytic standard errors are not sufficiently conservative or that
our results are driven by bias in our estimator.
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A. Identification and the Exclusion Restriction
In order for our instrument to be valid, it must be strongly correlated with 1 /d and
satisfy the exclusion restriction. The necessary strong correlation is directly verified
in first-stage regressions and can be seen in Figure 4. In this setting, the exclusion
restriction can be written as
(ER)	
War(i , j),y  ⫫ Z(i, j),y  | {(1 / d)(i, j),y, X(i, j),y, θy , θ( i, j)}.
The exclusion restriction cannot be directly tested and faces an array of potential
concerns. Note that (ER) requires that the on-path deaths we use to construct our
instrument are independent of war probability conditional on observables. In other
words, our identifying assumption is that recent o n-path deaths relate to war only
through their impact on network distance. Violations of (ER) can be thought of in
three classes: reverse causality, effects through nonnetwork channels, and omitted
variables.
The most obvious threat to (ER) is reverse causality. In other words, one might
worry that on-path deaths are caused by wars and not vice versa. This concern is
partially dealt with by only using lagged deaths to construct our instrument. We also
exclude politically motivated on-path deaths from our analysis. Indirect channels
such as war increasing the likelihood of death by cutting supply lines or otherwise
affecting environmental factors are implausible given the close-death placebo null
result. We can also address reverse causality by selectively excluding deaths that
are possibly caused by a tense political situation. The default instrument already
excludes violent political deaths. In the next subsection, our robustness analysis
investigates further restrictions on the list of deaths used for identification.
A second concern is that deaths directly affect war frequency through n onnetwork
channels. For instance, these deaths could have a direct effect on war by creating
political instability. For example, they may alter lines of succession, install inexperienced individuals in senior leadership positions, or simply have a psychological
effect on one of the rulers. Our “any war” event study rules out the possibility that
on-path deaths create political vacuums that increase the chance of war generally
rather than bilaterally. The event study section also established that the deaths of
close relatives “off-path” are not correlated with increased war frequency. In principle, this rules out the possibility that deaths of individuals closely connected to a
ruler have a direct effect on war incidence. Admittedly, the deaths of close relatives
are not a perfect placebo. For example, close relatives may be more or less likely
to be in positions of responsibility than on-path royals. To address these issues, our
robustness analysis investigates the effects of nonmonarch deaths and deaths of individuals from third-party countries.
Third, we might face an omitted variable problem. For instance, a major epidemic
or famine might cause both noble deaths and political turmoil. Regarding these specific examples, none of our royals with identified causes of death died of starvation
and only a single one died of plague. While epidemics did occur during our time
period, these were localized to a single city or region. The two major continent-wide
epidemics, the Black Death (peaking c.1346–1353) and the Spanish Flu (1918),
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Table 7—Robustness: Cause of Death

(Path) −1
Genetic Tie
Same Religion
Adjacent
Neither Landlocked
ln(Distance)
Pair fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
Notes

War
(1)

War
(2)

War
(3)

−0.336
(0.134)
0.0375
(0.0166)
−0.000767
(0.0103)
0.0303
(0.0201)
0.00179
(0.00473)
−0.0128
(∙)

−0.321
(0.133)
0.0363
(0.0111)
−0.00174
(0.0124)
0.0303
(0.0201)
0.00140
(0.00475)
−0.0125
(∙)

−0.323
(0.0869)
0.0365
(0.0121)
−0.00160
(0.00850)
0.0303
(0.0201)
0.00146
(0.00437)
−0.0125
(∙)

X
X
87,236
Known cause deaths

X
X
87,236
Unexpected deaths

X
X
87,236
Nonstress deaths

Notes: This table reestimates the main specification (Table 4, column 2) using alternate lists
of on-path deaths. All specifications include fixed effects for dyad and year. Standard errors
clustered two-way by country are reported in parentheses. Omitted standard errors are due to
insufficient variation (within dyad).

lie outside our analysis period. Of course, there are potentially many other omitted variables. We partially address this issue through the use of fixed effects. The
inclusion of dyad fixed effects removes any persistent, dyad-specific unobservables,
while year fixed effects remove temporary, widespread shocks. In addition, as a
robustness test, we study a model with c ountry-year fixed effects that accounts for
time-varying, country-specific unobservables that might cause both royal deaths
and wars.
Supposing the instrument is valid, it is important to think carefully about what
this source of variation allows us to identify. On-path deaths can only occur along
existing network paths, and the variation is always in the direction of reducing connectivity. Our estimates are of the marginal impact of increases in network distance
on conflict activity within dyads that share kinship ties. Thus, the correct interpretation of results based on this instrument is as a local average treatment effect. In
principle, changes in living kinship ties may be directionally asymmetric. Thus,
our analysis does not provide direct evidence on how an unconnected dyad would
respond to the formation of a new kinship tie.29 In future work, this could potentially be addressed through a structural model of the specific mechanism through
which kinship networks reduce conflict.

29
Earlier versions of this paper explored potential instruments for increases in connectivity. However, these
tend to suffer from a lack of power. For instance, we attempted to leverage the occurrence of opposite gender firstborn children of rulers to instrument for the probability of royal marriage. While point estimates are consistent with
a symmetric effect, there are too few prince-princess marriages to yield statistical significance.
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Table 8—Robustness: Alternate Mechanisms

(Path) −1
Genetic Tie
Same Religion
Adjacent
Neither Landlocked
ln(Distance)
Pair fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Country-year fixed effects
F-statistic
Notes

War
(1)

War
(2)

−0.484
(0.123)
0.0497
(0.0145)
0.00908
(0.00906)
0.0304
(0.0210)
0.00568
(0.00433)
−0.0165
(∙)
X
X

−0.161
(0.0653)
0.0231
(0.0146)
−0.0124
(0.00902)
0.0302
(0.0193)
−0.00280
(0.00466)
−0.00850
(∙)
X
X

87,236
Third-party

87,236
Nonruler

War
(3)

War
(4)

−0.138
(0.0516)
0.0178
(0.0110)
−0.00296
(0.0104)
0.0270
(0.0123)
−0.00218
(0.00475)
−0.0310
(0.00797)

−0.124
(0.0583)
0.0156
(0.00913)
−0.0233
(0.00732)
0.0146
(0.0112)
−0.00208
(0.00632)
−0.0105
(0.0220)
X

X
87,281

X
87,236

Notes: The first two columns of this table modify the main specification (Table 4, column 2) by excluding certain
on-path deaths that might change war probability through a mechanism other than kinship ties. The first column
restricts attention to the deaths of individuals not known to be close associates of the rulers of the impacted dyads.
The second column restricts attention to the on-path deaths of nonrulers. Columns 3 and 4 include country-year
fixed effects alone and in combination with pair effects, respectively. Omitted standard errors are due to insufficient
variation (within dyad).

B. IV Robustness
In order to address the concerns discussed above, we investigate how our main IV
result (Table 4, column 2) is affected by various alternative specifications. In particular, we restrict attention to different subsets of the data and alternate definitions of
the instrument. Tables 7, 8, and 9 report these robustness checks.30
Table 7 reports estimates using alternate instruments that remove deaths of certain types. All three of these specifications produce very similar point estimates
and are not significantly different than our main result. Column 1 restricts attention
to deaths of known cause. Column 3 removes any death that appears to have been
related to stress induced by either domestic or international political concerns. This
helps to address the concern that a tense geopolitical situation might be an omitted
variable that leads to both on-path death and war. Finally, there were a significant
number of individuals whom we were unable to identify causes of death for. Column
2 uses only unexpected deaths.
In Table 8, we attempt to exclude alternate mechanisms that could be driving our
results. For example, the death of a monarch’s close relative may mean the loss of an
important advisor or removal of a key political ally. This, in turn, could increase the
chance of war. Column 1 shows that focusing exclusively on deaths of mutual relatives from third-party countries actually increases the size of our effect. Third-party

30

All first-stage regressions pass weak instrument tests and are omitted for brevity.
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Table 9—Sample Restriction Robustness

(Path) −1
Genetic Tie
Same Religion
Adjacent
Neither Landlocked
ln(Distance)
Pair fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
Notes

War
(1)

War
(2)

War
(3)

War
(4)

−0.281
(0.0951)
0.0361
(0.0191)
−0.0104
(0.0126)
0.0612
(0.0293)
−0.00598
(0.00850)
−0.0412
(0.0130)

−0.179
(0.0609)
0.00810
(0.00784)
0.0161
(.)
0.00728
(0.0283)
0.00271
(0.00350)
−0.00119
(0.00500)

−0.310
(0.116)
0.0356
(0.0132)
−0.00462
(0.0112)
0.0345
(0.0253)
0.00636
(0.00363)
0.0115
(.)

−0.256
(0.120)
0.0329
(0.0106)
−0.00356
(0.0106)
0.0335
(0.0280)

X
X
57,814
Pre-1800

X
X
29,272
Post-1800

X
X
53,307
Drop Habsburgs

X
X
25,082
Long-lived polities

Notes: This table reestimates the main specification (Table 4, column 2) using various restricted samples. Column
3 drops all dyads including at least one Habsburg ruler. Column 4 includes only countries that existed for at least
85 percent of sample years. All specifications include fixed effects for dyad and year. Standard errors clustered twoway by country are reported in parentheses. Omitted standard errors are due to insufficient variation (within dyad).

deaths are on-path deaths with two additional characteristics. First, the individual
is not known to have died in either of the dyad countries. Second, the individual is
not known to be a member of a dynasty currently ruling either of the two countries.
Another possibility is that the death of monarchs causes power vacuums that
lead to more frequent war. To address this possibility, column 2 restricts attention to
on-path deaths of n onmonarchs. We see this somewhat reduces the measured effect
size; however, the change in network distance remains an important and statistically
significant predictor of war incidence in this specification. Finally, one might be
concerned that the effect we observe is not bilateral but instead that the death of a
relative affects a ruler’s likelihood of fighting wars with all parties without regard to
the kinship network structure. We address this issue in columns 3 and 4. These specifications show that our result still holds when using c ountry-year fixed effects. In
other words, even controlling for potential short-run increases in a country’s overall
bellicosity following network disruptions, we still find that the effect is differentially
stronger within the dyad. This final result is consistent with the null relationship
between o n-path death and “Any War” in event study Figure 7.
Finally, Table 9 reports our analyses for different subsets of the data. Columns 1 and
2 suggest that the effect of kinship on conflict is time varying, with a more substantial
effect in the earlier part of our sample. This is unsurprising since the centralization of
power in the hands of monarchs decreased and diplomacy increasingly professionalized in the modern period (corresponding roughly to the last century of our data).
Column 3 shows that the estimated effect is roughly unchanged when dyads including
Habsburg rulers are dropped. To create a more balanced panel, column 4 restricts
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attention to polities that are in our sample in at least 8 5 percentof observed years.31
The estimated coefficient is similar to our main specification. This should assuage
concerns that our estimates are biased due to endogenous entrance and exit from our
sample as the result of war outcomes, or due to our country inclusion criteria.
C. Robust Randomization Inference
A final potential issue for our estimates is the correlation structure of the death
shocks. An important feature of our data is that a single death typically leads to many
shortest path disruptions. These disruptions change a single ruler’s connection with
many other states. Because our instrument is based on these disruptions, correlation
of this type would cause standard errors to be too small. Two-way clustered standard errors are meant to be robust to these correlations. With those standard errors,
our main results are highly significant—often at the 0.1 percent level. However,
Cameron and Miller (2015) show this clustering procedure fails to account for some
possible types of correlation.
To confirm that our analytic standard errors are not overconfident, we conduct
robust randomization inference based on M
 onte Carlo analysis. We do this by
randomly generating a series of placebo instruments and reestimate our main IV
specification.
To make our placebo simulations comparable to the true instrument, we use the
following procedure. We begin by randomly assigning “base” treatment events to
specific ruler-years. We use Bernoulli draws with a parameter calibrated to generate an expected 274 base events (the number of nonpolitical deaths in the data).
This mimics the individual deaths underlying our instrument. We then flip a coin
to decide which of the two rulers the placebo “death” was closer to. We assign
placebo o n-path death events to every dyad that ruler is connected to in that year.
This procedure makes the simulated instrument even more correlated across specific
ruler-years than the true instrument. Therefore, this approach is robust in the sense
that it produces a more dispersed distribution of coefficient estimates. This exercise
yields the distribution of estimates an instrument like ours would produce by chance.
This procedure is performed 10,000 times. For each iteration, we replicate the
instrumental variable analysis from Table 4, column 2. The parameter of interest is
the 2SLS estimated coefficient on inverse path length generated by instrumenting
with these placebo treatments. Summary statistics and the histogram of estimated
values are presented in Figure 8.
The mean estimate in these simulations is 0.0475. This alleviates concerns that
our main estimator is negatively biased. The standard deviation of the simulated
estimates, 0.0478, is smaller than our analytic standard error (0.0667). The coefficient estimated on the real data, −0.285, is more negative than any of the 10,000
simulated estimates. We conclude it is highly unlikely that our main estimate was
produced by chance.
31
Ninety percent or 95 percent thresholds produce qualitatively similar results. Eighty-five percent is the lowest
natural threshold, which excludes France, a country that became a republic (and thus exited our sample) several
times, the last of which as a result of a defeat in war.
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Figure 8
Note: Distribution of simulated estimates of the effect of inverse s hortest path length on war, instrumented using
placebo s hortest path deaths.

VI. Conclusion

We construct a dataset that links a genealogy of European royals to lists of sovereign monarchies, interstate wars, and several covariates. The data provide a rich
environment to study the influence of interpersonal relationships on long-run macroeconomic, political, and institutional outcomes. This paper focused on the relationship between kinship and conflict. However, the same data and network tools
might well be applied to more traditional economic questions. We think future
work investigating the long-run implications of leaders’ kinship networks for trade,
growth, cultural diffusion, and development will be fruitful.
The data reveal a dramatic increase in kinship connections between European
monarchs over time. Viewing the genealogy as a kinship network, we use exogenous
variation in network structure to provide evidence that close living kinship ties substantially reduced the frequency and duration of war.
Consistent with existing literature, we document a decline in conflict in Europe
after 1800. Specifically, we observe 3.01 percent of d yad-years at war from 1 495
to 1600 compared to only 1.38 percent from 1 800 to 1918. Given these findings,
it is natural to ask how much of this decline can be attributed to increased kinship
ties. While it is difficult to say definitively, our results allow a b ack-of-the-envelope
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analysis. Suppose we replaced the nineteenth century’s kinship network with its
sixteenth-century counterpart. This would result in average inverse shortest path
length falling from 0.118 to 0.073. In the post-1800 subsample, we estimate a reduction in connectivity of this magnitude would cause war incidence to increase by 0.73
percentage points. Thus, our results suggest that roughly 45 percent of the decline in
war can be attributed to growing kinship ties between rulers. While we acknowledge
this sort of extrapolation is imperfect, it suggests that royal family networks played
a significant role in keeping the peace.
This important quantitative role for dynastic marriage in international politics is
consistent with its historical reach. Dynastic marriages and marriage alliance were
not just a feature of early modern European politics but are a recurrent phenomenon across regions of the world and levels of development. Dynastic marriages
are mentioned in the Bible (between King Solomon and a Pharaoh’s daughter),
are used to settle disputes between warring primitive tribes (Lévi-Strauss 1949),
and are invoked today in debates around Chinese sovereignty over Tibet (Princess
Wencheng of the Tang Dynasty was married to the King of Tibet in 641).
One broad takeaway from this project is that international relations models that
eschew the role of individuals in favor of the collective state are likely ignoring
important variables. Rather than being solely driven by abstract geostrategic imperatives, we show that international political outcomes are greatly influenced by a
leader’s personal identity and interpersonal relationships. This is in line with the
public choice tradition, which emphasizes the role of the individual in politics. It is
also consistent with Jones and Olken (2005), who find that the identity of autocratic
world leaders has been an important determinant of economic growth in the modern
age.
While our study is focused on a specific region and bygone era, its key message
is universal and timeless. Close lines of communication and tight personal relationships between leaders are vital to preserving peace. In the past, these ties took the
form of royal family relationships. Today, professional diplomats may play the same
role. Interruptions of these linkages can have devastating consequences, and thus
redundancy in these systems is highly desirable.
REFERENCES
Ancestry.com. 2018. The Ancestry.com Online Genealogy – Multiple Entries. Retrieved December 3,

2018. www.ancestry.com. See data for detailed tabular citations.

Banerjee, Abhijit, Arun G. Chandrasekhar, Esther Duflo, and Matthew O. Jackson. 2016. “Gossip:

Identifying Central Individuals in a Social Network.” Stanford Working Paper 515.

Benzell, Seth G. and Kevin Cooke. 2021. “Replication data for: A Network of Thrones: Kinship and

Conflict in Europe, 1495–1918.” American Economic Association [publisher], Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]. https://doi.org/10.3886/E117045V1.
Bonney, Richard. 1991. The European Dynastic States, 1494–1660. Short Oxford History of the Modern World. New York: Oxford University Press.
Brecke, Peter. 2012. “Violent Conflicts 1400 AD to the Present in Different Regions of the World.”
Unpublished.
Cameron, A. Colin, and Douglas L. Miller. 2015. “A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference.”
Journal of Human Resources 50 (2): 317–72.
Cokayne, George Edward, ed. 1890. Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain
and the United Kingdom: Extant, Extinct, or Dormant. London: George Bell and Sons.

132

AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: APPLIED ECONOMICS

JULY 2021

Cummins, Neil. 2017. “Lifespans of the European Elite: 800–1800.” Journal of Economic History

77 (2): 406–39.

Curzon, Catherine. 2018. Madame Gilflurt’s Guide to Life: Glorious Georgian Gossip from the Quill

of Catherine Curzon. Notable Deaths – Multiple Entries. Retrieved December 3, 2018. www.
madamegilflurt.com. See data for tabular citations.
de la Croix, David, and Omar Licandro. 2015. “The Longevity of Famous People from Hammurabi to
Einstein.” Journal of Economic Growth 20 (3): 263–303.
Dube, Oeindrila, and S.P. Harish. 2020. “Queens.” Journal of Political Economy 128 (7): 2579–2652.
Egan, E.W., Constance B. Hintz, and Leonard F. Wise, ed. 1976. Kings, Rulers and Statesmen. New
York: Sterling.
Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition. 2018. Multiple entries. Retrieved December 3, 2018.
www.britannica.com. See data for detailed tabular citations.
Encyclopedia.com. 2018. People: History – Multiple Entries. Retrieved December 3, 2018. www.
Encyclopedia.com. See data for detailed tabular citations.
Erasmus, Desiderius. The Education of a Christian Prince. Translated by Lester K. Born. New York: W.W.
Norton, 1968. Originally published as Institutio Principis Christiani. (1532).
Fichtner, Paula Sutter. 1976. “Dynastic Marriage in Sixteenth-Century Habsburg Diplomacy and

Statecraft: An Interdisciplinary Approach.” American Historical Review 81 (2): 243–65.

Fisman, Raymond. 2001. “Estimating the Value of Political Connections.” American Economic Review

91 (4): 1095–1102.

Fleming, Patricia H. 1973. “The Politics of Marriage among Non-Catholic European Royalty.” Current

Anthropology 14 (3): 231–49.

Gat, Azar. 2013. “Is War Declining—and Why?” Journal of Peace Research 50 (2): 149–57.
Geneanet. 2018. The Genealogy Library – Multiple Entries. Retrieved December 3, 2018. www.

en.geneanet.org. See data for detailed tabular citations.

Geni.com. 2018. Geni Online Genealogy – Multiple Entries. Retrieved December 3, 2018. www.geni.

com. See data for detailed tabular citations.

Gibler, Douglas M. 2008. International Military Alliances, 1648–2008. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Heritage History. 2018. Resources – Multiple Entries. Retrieved December 3, 2018. www.heritage-

history.com. See data for detailed tabular citations.

Hoffman, Philip T. 2012. “Why Was It Europeans Who Conquered the World?” Journal of Economic

History 72 (3): 601–33.

Hooker, David. 2018. The Hooker Family Genealogy Page – Multiple Entries. Retrieved December 3,

2018. www.djhooker.com. See data for detailed tabular citations.

Iyigun, Murat. 2008. “Luther and Suleyman.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (4): 1465–94.
Iyigun, Murat, Nathan Nunn, and Nancy Qian. 2017. “Winter Is Coming: The Long-Run Effects of

Climate Change on Conflict, 1400–1900.” NBER Working Paper 23033.

Jackson, Matthew O. 2008. Social and Economic Networks. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Jackson, Matthew O., and Stephen Nei. 2015. “Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and Interna-

tional Trade.” PNAS 112 (50): 15277–84.

Jones, Benjamin F., and Benjamin A. Olken. 2005. “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and

Growth since World War II.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (3): 835–64.
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